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My Country, Right or Wrong
If the Cause is Just, is Anything Allowed?
David Whetham
Director of the King’s Centre for Military Ethics, and Reader 
in Military Ethics in the Defense Studies Department, King’s 
College London
Abstract
If one’s cause is just, why should the righteous be treated the same as the 
unjust? If one side is clearly right and the other side is clearly wrong, shouldn’t 
the side that is in the right be permitted to do whatever is required to win? 
Why should the “good” side be forced to fight with “one hand tied behind 
its back” when the “bad” side doesn’t care about the rules and refuses to 
adhere to them? This article addresses these questions, arguing that it is often 
difficult to know with absolute certainty that one is on the “right” side, and 
there are good reasons for adhering to limits in one’s conduct even when 
convinced that one’s country does indeed have justice on its side.
How Do You Know You Are on the Right Side and Does it 
Matter?
Traditionally, within the just war canon of thought, there exists a dis-
tinction between the jus ad bellum (what is required to justify going to war) 
and the jus in bello levels of war (what can legitimately be done within that 
conflict). This distinction between the two levels of conflict, in theory, 
allows us to draw a line of moral responsibility between the decision to 
go to war and the actual conduct of that war. Soldiers are not necessarily 
responsible for the decision to send them to war (except as far as they par-
ticipate as members of a democratic state). However, they are responsible 
for the actual conduct of the war—fighting it in a legitimate way. While 
determining exactly where this line is drawn is not always straightforward, 
Michael Walzer (1992, 39) suggests that we know that the most senior of 
military officers straddle this line between the two levels, and in doing 
so, this usefully gives us a pretty good idea of where that moral division 
should be made.
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While distinct, the two levels of war are still clearly related in a number 
of ways. For example, while one cannot make an unjust cause better by 
fighting for it “well,” one can certainly undermine an otherwise just cause 
by fighting it in way that outrages the “common decency of mankind” 
(Whetham 2010b, 17). However, if one is to accept this separation as a 
dividing line of moral responsibility as well, it seems to answer the first of 
our questions immediately—“how do you know if you are on the right side 
and does it matter?” The division of moral responsibility appears to allow 
soldiers to participate in wars even when they are not entirely convinced 
that it is the right thing to do precisely because they are not responsible for 
the decision to go to war. Therefore it does not matter if they are “on the 
right side,” for that is simply not their concern. Nor should they be held 
accountable for being “on the wrong side” if they lose. As Imiola (2014, 
21) points out: “Wehrmacht soldiers after the Second World War and Iraqi 
soldiers after the Gulf War were not viewed as guilty for the crime of war 
nor punished for fighting for an unjust cause.” Shakespeare captures the same 
reasoning in his play Henry V (Act 4, Scene 1), where there is an exchange 
between soldiers on the eve of the Battle of Agincourt:
BATES: . . . we know enough, if we know we are the king’s sub-
jects: if his cause be wrong, our obedience to the king wipes 
the crime of it out of us.
WILLIAMS: But if the cause be not good, the king himself hath 
a heavy reckoning to make, when all those legs and arms and 
heads, chopped off in battle.
Writing at about the same time as Shakespeare, Francisco de Vitoria (quoted 
in Walzer 1992, 39) argued that embracing this distinction was important 
for the security of the state:
If subjects can not serve in war except they are first satisfied of its 
justice, the State would fall into grave peril and the door would 
be opened to wrongdoing . . . if subjects in a case of doubt do not 
follow their prince to the war, they expose themselves to the risk 
of betraying their state to the enemy, and this is a much more 
serious thing than fighting against the enemy despite a doubt.
Going back even further, in the fourth century Augustine argued that rulers 
had an obligation to maintain the peace for their realm (Fortin and Kries 
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1994, 222). It was this very obligation to maintain peace that paradoxically 
gave those rulers the duty to wage war if that was what was required to 
uphold the peace on behalf of their people. Therefore, subjects were obliged 
to participate in a war declared by such a legitimate ruler for the common 
good (Bellamy 2006, 28). One can hardly be blamed for something over 
which one has no choice.
This traditional approach to the question has many contemporary sup-
porters as well. For example, David Fisher (2014) argues that just as Augus-
tine saw the legitimacy of rulers as coming from their role as protector 
of the common good, so too must the military today understand its role 
within a democracy: the military’s role is to obey orders from the civil 
authority. The civil authority itself derives its legitimacy from the mandate 
provided by the society it represents along with the necessary checks and 
balances of due democratic process. When the state makes a decision to go 
to war, and that decision is in accord with due democratic principles, it is 
not up to the individual soldier to question this. Indeed, some argue that 
were they to do so en masse it would potentially lead to chaos (Wall 2010, 
222). Therefore, the logic is clear: in the absence of clear evidence to the 
contrary, soldiers on both sides of a dispute are required to give their own 
leaders the benefit of the doubt.
However, the traditional argument was actually developed further by 
Vitoria with the addition of a very important qualification when he stated 
that there were limits as to how far soldiers could wash their hands of moral 
responsibility, even in war (Reichberg, Syse, and Begby 2006, 318-19). 
Specifically, he argued that it was possible that someone could be faced 
with “arguments and proofs of the injustice of war so powerful, that even 
citizens and subjects . . . may not use ignorance as an excuse for serving as 
soldiers . . . [I]f the war seems patently unjust to the subject, he must not fight, 
even if he is ordered to do so by the prince.” If one was unsure or simply 
had some loosely formulated doubts, then one’s duty is to put such doubts 
aside and obey the king/prince/president, for surely he is in the better 
position to judge. However, knowingly obeying a clearly unjust or illegal 
order crosses the moral boundary and makes the soldier just as culpable as 
the king. While Vitoria was writing nearly 500 years ago, this is a theme 
that still has clear contemporary relevance (Whetham 2010c, 74). Indeed, 
Vitoria’s important qualification “represents a succinct account of the legal 
arguments regarding the limitations on obedience and the duty of dissent 
raised during the Nuremberg war crimes trials following World War II” 
3
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(Lucas 2009). Just as there are some acts that are heinously wrong, surely 
there are some wars that appear so blatantly unjustifiable that one cannot 
claim the defense of simply following superior orders if one takes part. We 
do not expect our individual soldiers to be moral automata, but how far 
into the political realm do we rightly want their moral questioning to go?
Today, all professional militaries around the word acknowledge that 
there is a duty to disobey or disregard a blatantly illegal order. At the same 
time however, there is also a clear expectation that such duties are limited 
to tactical level considerations: it is not up to the soldier to question the 
policy of his or her government; so one can disagree at the ballot box but 
not in the barracks or in the context of combat. The assumption is that 
most soldiers are simply not in a position to know all the relevant facts 
about their government’s decision to go to war and so are not able to reach 
a suitably informed judgment on the justice or injustice of the war. At this 
level they have what is referred to as “invincible ignorance” (see Sola 2009). 
If faced with an illegal order on a local, direct level where doing the right 
or wrong thing can be clearly determined, the individual involved has a 
clear requirement to “do the right thing,” which may involve refusing to 
obey the instruction. So for example, Zupan argues, “if a lieutenant in a fit 
of rage orders a sergeant to bayonet a baby to ‘inspire’ villagers to provide 
information . . . [t]here is no ambiguity. The order is a clear assault against 
human decency, a clear violation of jus in bello proscriptions.” However, if a 
soldier has doubts about the justice of the actual war itself, “the jus ad bellum 
assessments are far more complex and at a higher level of abstraction than the 
scenario about stabbing the baby” (Zupan 2014, 90). The traditional view 
is that the access to the knowledge that is required for a definitive answer 
at the ad bellum level is often simply beyond the scope of most people in the 
chain of command, apart from those at the very top. The common military 
institutional expectation is therefore that for the vast majority of people 
involved, “they should exercise humility and . . . defer to those who are in 
a better position to judge” (Ellner, Robinson, and Whetham 2014a, 8).
One of the practical implications of this graded moral responsibility is 
that soldiers on both sides of the battle—just and unjust—should be treated 
the same. This forms the basis of the moral equality of combatants that 
has underpinned our traditional understanding of responsibility regarding 
war. Even where giving the benefit of the doubt is not an issue, Vitoria 
and Aquinas accept that error may induce belligerents to believe that they 
are in the right, when in fact they might actually be squarely at fault. 
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This can obviously lead to situations in which the “guilty party (sincerely) 
believes itself to be innocent” (Reichberg, Syse, and Begby 2006, 317). 
After all, very few people would deliberately fight for a cause they knew 
was wrong. Because of the lack of metaphysical certainty when it comes to 
this area, Vitoria demonstrates clearly why both sides are obliged to afford 
their opponents some respect and conduct their conflict within limits: it 
doesn’t matter “who started it.” This sense of moral equality (at least as far 
as the soldiers, if not their political masters, are concerned) is beautifully 
articulated on the Kemal Atatürk Memorial in Gallipoli: “There is no dif-
ference between the Johnnies and the Mehmets to us where they lie side 
by side now here in this country of ours.”
Contemporary Challenges
This traditional “default” position at the heart of the just war tradition 
has come under increasing pressure in recent years from a number of dif-
ferent directions (e.g., McMahan 2009; Rodin 2011). Some argue that the 
context has fundamentally changed, that unlike in Vitoria’s day, the average 
citizen in a Western liberal democracy with a healthy civic society and a 
free press holding the government to account has the potential to be far 
better informed about what is going on in the world. The assumption that 
“our political masters know best” has rather too frequently been shattered 
by “Dodgy Dossiers,” fabricated intelligence reports, and political scandals. 
The degree of public outrage at the decision to go to war in Iraq in 2003 
demonstrated that it appears that the princes in that case have turned out 
to be no better informed than anyone else. Perhaps in an age of wars of 
national survival, it was imperative to give the benefit of the doubt to the 
ruler, but having the same confidence when confronted with what has been 
called a “war of choice” in which vital national interests are not obviously 
at stake does not seem quite so straightforward. At the same time, modern 
soldiers are better educated and better informed than their predecessors. 
Everybody has access to the ubiquitous media, meaning that apart from 
certain types of very short notice deployment, only those who choose not 
to find out about the world (or are forced to rely on only biased media/
propaganda) remain in a true state of ignorance (Zupan 2014). Military 
institutions in all of the democratic states around the world spend time and 
effort in trying to ensure that they mold people capable of making appropri-
ate ethical decisions in the complex security environment in which they 
are expected to work. Their moral reasoning is nurtured precisely because 
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the environment does not always easily lend itself to easy answers. When 
such training is combined with unfettered access to pertinent information 
Ellner (2014, 347) suggests that “service members at all levels are episte-
mologically capable of exercising moral agency responsibly and sincerely.” 
Unjust wars get fought at least in part because those fighting them fail to 
recognize this and do not challenge the orders they are given (Robinson 
2009), choose not to look hard enough into the causes (McMahan 2009), 
or ignore their professional responsibilities to withhold their service (resign, 
seek reassignment, apply for conscientious objector status, etc.) if they judge 
it is being used for illegitimate purposes (Wolfendale 2009).1
If arguments such as these carry weight, it is difficult to see how mili-
tary personnel who are engaged in fighting an unjust war can be totally 
excused from moral responsibility for fighting in such a war. “It cannot 
become permissible to do an otherwise impermissible act just because 
the responsibility for it would go to someone else” (McMahan 2014, xii). 
Brian Orend (2006, 109) suggests that we may consider such persons to 
be like minor accomplices to a major crime: perhaps they are not fully 
responsible for the jus ad bellum violations involved in engaging in the war 
in the first place. Nonetheless, by going along with it anyway, they are still 
not totally blameless. Such thinking gnaws away at the traditional separa-
tion of the levels of moral responsibility. While retaining the traditional 
moral dividing lines is a position robustly defended by many people (e.g., 
Bergeron, Fisher, and Skerker in Ellner, Robinson, and Whetham 2014b), 
“my country, right or wrong” no longer sounds quite as convincing to 
many people in the military in the context of contemporary decisions about 
resort to armed force.
Where Does This Leave the “Common” Soldier Trying to Serve 
in a Democratic State?
While it can appear obvious which side has more relative merits than 
the other when one is observing a conflict from the outside, or with the 
comfortable distance of historical hindsight, making the same decision 
from within one of the parties to a conflict is rather harder. Being able to 
determine whose side of an argument is more just is obviously not an exact 
science. Even with the amazing range of sources and information available 
1.  Wolfendale (2009) has argued that if the military is to be considered a profession at 
all, then its members must have a professional obligation to withhold their services if the 
mission is not in the interests of the state as a whole. She argues that such a professional 
obligation falls on both the individual and the organization.
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in a networked, twenty-first century liberal democracy, it can be very hard 
to find a truly balanced assessment of contentious arguments.
There was much talk and discussion about “evidence” and “proof” of 
weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) in the run-up to the Iraq War in 
2003. From many conversations that this author had with serving military 
personnel at the time, there was a feeling that either the other arguments 
put forward regarding the violations of ceasefire provisions, etc., were 
sufficient in themselves to justify military action, or that there was prob-
ably some further compelling evidence regarding WMDs that could not 
be put into the public domain for “security reasons.” Effectively, many 
military personnel who took part in Iraqi Freedom later that year despite 
their doubts had consciously or subconsciously applied Vitoria’s test and 
decided that they owed their Prince the benefit of the doubt (even if some 
were later to feel betrayed as events unfolded).
It might be useful to ask whom does one actually serve as a professional 
soldier. If the answer is “one’s country,” where does that leave the military 
when the political elite take the country to a war not supported by the 
people (or even in extreme cases, against the people)? This is, of course, 
even in democratic states not a purely hypothetical issue: Britain’s Chief of 
the Defense Staff, General Sir Nicholas Houghton (2013), has recognized 
that the type of overseas expeditionary operations that are currently the 
norm can create a potential disconnect between public opinion and policy 
decisions regarding war and peace: “The UK’s armed forces have never, 
in the 40 years I have known, been held in such popular high regard. But 
the purposes to which they have most recently been put has seldom been 
more deeply questioned.”
It would be churlish not to recognize that at least some of this disconnect 
comes from the lingering controversy surrounding that decision to invade 
Iraq in 2003. The scale of the disagreement was unprecedented, dwarfing 
even the Vietnam protests from the previous century. On February 15, 2003, 
more than 600 cities worldwide were involved in what has been described 
as the “largest protest event in human history” (Walgrave and Rucht 2010, 
xiii). Official police figures put the attendance in London alone as well 
in excess of 750,000 people, and the BBC (2003) estimated that around a 
million attended, making it the largest march London had ever seen. In 
light of such divisions between government and a large percentage of the 
people, should the military try to serve the democratic will of the people 
rather than obey the directions of the governing authorities? Unfortunately, 
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the matter is not as simple as looking at surveys to see what the majority 
of the population wishes. Williams (2013, 63) notes that depending on the 
way the question was framed, opinion polls in the period preceding the 
contentious war against Iraq in 2003 were contradictory at best.
Thankfully, professional soldiers in democratic states are not obliged 
to try to second-guess public opinion because the oath of allegiance they 
swear is to the constitution rather than to the ruler, the people, opinion 
polls, or even the government. On the face of it, this looks rather different 
in the UK, where those enlisted into the British Army or Royal Air Force 
actually swear to be faithful and bear true allegiance to the monarch.2 
However, due to the UK being without a formal written constitution (at 
least one that can be found in a single document), the monarch effectively 
acts as the physical embodiment of the British constitution. This means that 
while the words may look rather difficult, the sentiment is effectively the 
same: it is a commitment to serve the state as a whole rather than simply 
the government or ruler of the day or the whims of raw public opinion. 
Coleman (2012, 38) notes that while the practical distinction as to the 
direction of the oath of obedience is in most situations entirely irrelevant, 
there can, on occasion, be profound implications. For example, the Ger-
man military oath changed in 1934 from one swearing loyal service to the 
German people and country to an individual statement of unconditional 
obedience to Adolf Hitler, the Führer (this oath was obviously changed 
back at the end of World War II). The point is that this was problematic 
precisely because a professional military, at least in the modern era, is not 
supposed to serve an individual or even a class or a position. It is supposed 
to serve the whole state; it is there to provide the public good of security 
for the whole nation.
So does that mean that soldiers in democracies should just accept the 
orders from the people’s representatives in the government? Granting the 
benefit of the doubt to the government and trusting in the judgment of 
those higher up in the chain of command might still be an important part 
of ingrained military thinking; however, reflecting the changing times, 
this is no longer the unqualified deference one might have expected from 
Henry V’s army in 1415. Nor would such automatic deference even be 
necessarily expected today. For example, in the face of the vocal and wide-
spread opposition in 2003, the British government took the unprecedented 
2.  No oath is sworn by Royal Navy or Marine officers, as the Navy is maintained under 
the Royal Prerogative rather than an Act of Parliament.
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step of granting a parliamentary vote on military action even though the 
executive had the historical power vested in it to go to war without further 
discussion. This “constitutional novelty” looks likely to remain for future 
large-scale British military deployments (Williams 2013, 64) and, while it 
only went so far in meeting the “not in my name” objections from protest-
ers, did allow all the people’s representatives in Parliament to give a clear 
mandate to their military. Even in this case, though, the then Chief of the 
Defense Staff, Admiral Sir Michael Boyce, went further in a way that was 
again constitutionally unprecedented but also entirely in accordance with 
traditional thinking about gradated moral responsibility in such situations. 
He asked the UK Attorney General—the highest legal authority in the 
UK—for a clear ruling asking for a “yes or no answer” on the legality of 
the war (Torleton 2010). Only once satisfied with the ruling did Boyce 
commit British armed forces to the conflict. In this case, an objective 
judgment as to the war’s justice was not what was being sought, but there 
was certainly much heated debate at the time as to whether the UK really 
should be going to war in Iraq with or without a specific UN Security 
Council Resolution. Anyone in the rest of the military who harbored any 
doubts about the war’s legality were reassured in a very visible sense that 
the right questions had been asked by the right people and that the highest 
legal authority in the UK had been consulted on their behalf and given 
the legal “thumbs up” (even if this judgment has subsequently proved as 
controversial as the rest of the conflict).
This demonstration of the gradated moral responsibility assumes that 
those high enough in the military chain of command have access to all (or at 
least enough) of the information necessary to make an informed judgment. 
Vitoria made it clear that very senior military commanders have a specific 
professional responsibility to “speak truth to power” and examine the justice 
of a war, even if necessary, through their advice to the ruler, to try to avert a 
conflict they believe unjust.3 They are effectively charged with acting as the 
guardians of the military conscience. For this to work, there must be sufficient 
trust within the rest of the organization that those who do have access to the 
pertinent information at the political/strategic interface are actually asking 
the right questions on behalf of the rest of the organization, and indeed the 
country at large. General Sir Peter Wall (2010, 222) articulates for the case of 
the UK both this division of moral responsibility within the military and the 
3.  McMaster (1998) argues that there was an abdication of responsibility by American 
military leadership during the Vietnam War in precisely this area.
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duty that flows from it: “It is for the high command to ensure that intended 
operations satisfy jus ad bellum and to be prepared to reassure the members 
of the force that this is the case through the chain of command.” As long 
as there is confidence that such questions have genuinely been asked, then 
those further down the chain of command—those who do not have access 
to the full information and comprehensive arguments—should be able to 
“park their doubts” and participate.4
Unless they are actually already convinced that the cause is blatantly or 
manifestly wrong, or their confidence in the veracity of the arguments for 
war is so small that all trust has been lost (perhaps due to a history of false 
assurances, forged evidence, or a decision-making system that is known 
to be false or corrupted), granting the benefit of the doubt to the state in 
such situations does not seem unjustified. It is also not clear to many that 
one should automatically choose not to fight even if one does decide that 
one’s own side might have gotten it wrong. Isn’t there a duty to defend 
one’s state anyway? Admiral James B. Stockdale, distinguished veteran of 
the Vietnam War, long-term prisoner of war and subsequent founder of 
ethics education establishments at all levels of the U.S. Navy, provides an 
interesting case in point (see Stockdale 1995). He was present as an aviator 
during both of the Gulf of Tonkin incidents and knew for a fact that it was 
a U.S. ship that had fired first on August 2, 1964, and that no U.S. war-
ship had been fired upon at all on August 4. The stated “just cause” was a 
lie.5 However, once Congress had passed its resolution, Admiral Stockdale 
accepted its decision and served his country. Was he really wrong to do so? 
Even if the reasons are not right, once your state has decided it is going to 
war, can you really turn your back on your fellow soldiers, your friends, 
and your country, just when it really does need you? Admiral Stockdale 
obviously thought not. Would refusing to serve in such circumstances even 
be compatible with the professional military ethic? Kasher (2002, 173) 
argues that in the Israeli context:
Comradeship is an essential value of military ethics . . . [A]cts of 
civil disobedience that take the form of refusal by reserve officers 
4.  What exactly those senior commanders are supposed to do if they are unable to amend 
an unjust policy is more difficult, highlighting debate even within traditional just war 
thinking. For example, while Vitoria would prioritize individual conscience in the face of 
such a clear moral challenge, advocating the resignation of one’s commission for example, 
thinkers such as Suarez expect that once one has done one’s duty to try and avert a morally 
wrong course of action and has proved unsuccessful, one is then expected to execute the 
Prince’s orders. See Whetham (2010c: 74). See also Lucas (2009).
5.  For the declassified official report into these events, see Hanyok (2000/1).
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and NCOs to serve within the framework of their combat units 
cause damage to the necessary sense of military comradeship. 
Thereby they inflict damage on the democratic regime, which 
owes its citizenry an effective military force of self-defense.
As a result, someone who refuses to participate on moral grounds in such 
circumstances, becoming a selective conscientious objector, “puts saving 
his own conscience above his responsibility to help his comrades. Many 
see this as incompatible not only with the necessary virtue of comradeship 
but also with the virtue of self-sacrifice” (Ellner, Robinson, and Whetham 
2014b, 8). However, despite the complexities of the ad bellum considerations, 
it seems clear that obeying the rules in bello is much more straightforward. 
One is expected to uphold in bello considerations such as protecting civilians 
and causing no more harm to the enemy than military necessity demands 
regardless of the justification for the war, the authority on which it is waged, 
or the motivations one has for taking part in the fighting.
Can the Rules Ever Be Set Aside?
The War Convention is “a set of articulated norms, customs, professional 
codes, legal precepts, religious and philosophical principles, and recipro-
cal arrangements that shape our judgments of military conduct” (Walzer 
1992, 44). It encompasses the commonly held idea that in war it is possible 
to use deadly force in a legitimate way. So, for example, in everyday life 
there is a general prohibition on murder, but that does not mean that all 
killing is considered murder. A police officer acting in self-defense against 
a deadly threat may be justified in killing an attacker. Such an act would 
not generally be regarded as murder. Similarly, when one uses lethal force 
on behalf of one’s state or political community in a war, that too is gener-
ally not regarded as murder. It is accepted that it is not only excusable, but 
sometimes even worthy to kill in such situations (Whetham 2013, 116). Of 
course, that does not mean that all killing in war is justified, and it is still 
possible to commit murder even within a war (e.g., killing a surrendering 
combatant or deliberately targeting unarmed civilians). The War Conven-
tion, therefore, articulated through the laws of armed conflict, sets out 
what is acceptable and unacceptable practice in war. In one of his wartime 
speeches, Winston Churchill used the phrase “supreme emergency” to 
describe the existential peril that Britain found herself in when faced with 
imminent Nazi invasion. The idea was developed by Walzer (1992, 251–68) 
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to explore whether it was permissible to break or set aside such rules in 
the face of “an imminent catastrophe” to a people. Using the example of 
the mission given to RAF’s Bomber Command to target German cities, 
Walzer argued that extreme necessity may justify overriding the rights of 
innocent people on the ground, and therefore the shattering of the War 
Convention. Bomber Command was the only effective military instrument 
that Britain possessed at the time for taking the war to the Germans, and 
Britain’s hard-pressed Russian allies desperately needed help in the face 
of Operation Barbarossa and reverses on every front. Given the minimal 
chance of getting through air defenses in daylight, it was necessary to fly 
at night, but the limitations of available military technology meant that 
only something the size of a city could actually be realistically targeted in 
such circumstances. To do so would obviously violate the absolute prin-
ciple that one cannot deliberately target a civilian population, but given 
the terrible cost of defeat that would follow if the Nazi regime were to be 
successful, combined with the lack of viable military alternatives, violat-
ing such a principle could be argued to be justified in the circumstances. 
It should be noted here that despite a minority of dissent (Grayling 2007, 
179–206), the British government, the people as a whole, and the airmen 
who carried out the attacks on the whole did not doubt the just cause of 
the war against Germany; so the primary issue here was whether otherwise 
wrongful conduct could justified by specific circumstances.
Is such an ethical position tenable? Walzer (2004, 46) recognizes just 
how hard it is to justify breaking the normal rules and also how limited any 
exception must be: as Britain’s circumstance changed, new theaters of war 
opened up, new powerful allies joined the fight; long-range escorts were 
introduced, making daylight flying less deadly, while technology improved, 
making it possible to target more accurately, and most importantly, the threat 
of imminent invasion receded and the supreme emergency passed. As a 
result, the continued violation of the War Convention became less and less 
justifiable as the war continued (Walzer 1992, 261), and yet the bombing 
continued, actually increasing in intensity and destruction of civilian life. 
If the supreme emergency had ever truly existed, it had long since passed 
by the time 100,000 people were killed in Dresden in the spring of 1945. 
Whether or not the supreme emergency idea presents an ethically justifiable 
position at all is debated at some considerable length and divides ethicists 
(Cook 2007). Who is to judge the nature of such an existential threat? 
Wouldn’t this be the thin end of the wedge when everything begins to 
12
The International Journal of Ethical Leadership, Vol. 4 [2017], Art. 5
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/ijel/vol4/iss1/5
61Whetham  My Country, Right or Wrong
look like a “supreme emergency” if you are the one under threat? “What 
lesser evils may a society commit when it believes it faces the greater evil 
of its own destruction?” (Ignatieff 2005, 1).
What is clearer in the present context is that while the rise of a genuinely 
existential threat cannot be ruled out in the future, political rhetoric aside, 
it is the challenge of discretionary wars that we are routinely faced with 
today, where it is political interests rather than national survival that are at 
stake. It does not matter which side one is on: in this type of conflict, there 
is no conceivable excuse today for abandoning the rules and violating the 
ethical norms of war (cf. Whetham 2010d, 254).
Conclusion
Modern soldiers are expected (and indeed trained) to ask questions, and it 
seems nonsensical to say that this questioning should cease at some imaginary 
line beyond which they are no longer capable of making decisions. At the 
same time, it is necessary to accept that to expect the perfect knowledge 
that may be presented in a philosophical thought experiment is not always 
realistic in the messy reality of everyday life, let alone the extraordinary 
circumstances surrounding a decision to go to war. It is not always possible 
to know whether one’s own government has got it right, and to require the 
type of epistemic certainty before serving demanded by some of the just 
war tradition’s contemporary challengers is surely asking too much. As long 
as there are sufficient checks, balances, and accountability in the political 
system and chain of command (and these are probably going to be more 
robust in a functioning democracy than in other forms of government), 
a soldier should be able to have confidence that he or she will not be sent 
to fight on the objectively unjust side of a conflict. While there are many 
good reasons to challenge the old, comfortable moral division of labor, 
perhaps the best we can do for now is continue to accept that certainty 
of an unjust cause is a reason not to participate, while also accepting that 
doubts are normal and even desirable in an effective fighting force if it is 
not to turn into some kind of all-annihilating horde.
At the same time, just as Vitoria and the Nuremberg principles attest in 
their own ways, there are limits on the service that any state can expect 
from its servants. Whatever the objective rights and wrongs of the conflict 
in which they are participating, and regardless of whether they believe their 
cause to be just, there are no special freedoms or permissions granted to 
one side over the other. It doesn’t matter if you are on the “right” side, or 
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whether the other side flouts or ignores every rule in the book, one is still 
bound to fight within the rules. So the ultimate issue is how one fights 
when ordered to fight by his or her country: here is where the matter of 
justice cuts most keenly for the serving soldier, and how one fights is at 
least as important as what one fights for.
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